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We assess the transmission of the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations 
(TLTRO) to the bank credit supply for the Euro area (2014:05-2018:01) and for 
Portugal (2011:01-2018:01), using a panel data setup. For the Euro area, we find a 
positive relationship between the TLTRO and the amount of credit granted to the real 
economy. For the vulnerable countries, the effects of the TLTRO on the stock of credit 
increased from 2016 to 2017. Among the group of small banks, the effects are stronger 
in less vulnerable countries. We also find that competition has no statistically 
significant impact on the transmission of the TLTRO to the bank credit supply for the 
Euro area. For Portugal, using a difference-in-differences model, we find no 
statistically significant impact of the TLTRO on credit granted by banks. Finally, 
bidding banks set lower interest rates than non-bidding banks and the difference seems 
to be larger in 2017. In Portugal, the effects of the TLTRO on loan interest rates also 
increased from 2016 to 2017 and are stronger for small banks.  
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The 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) forced the major Central Banks to 
implement a set of unconventional Monetary Policy measures, assumed to have a temporary 
character (Mishkin, 2011; Roman and Purcel, 2014; Trichet, 2013). These unprecedented 
measures were aimed at restoring the stability of the financial markets and the correct 
functioning of the Monetary Policy transmission mechanism and consisted of liquidity 
injections via credit refinancing operations at low interest rates, asset purchases from the market 
in order to lower interest rates, the reduction of Monetary Policy official interest rates and 
forward guidance on policy announcements (Acharya et al, 2012; Driffill, 2016; Gertler and 
Karadi, 2010; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). 
Among the unconventional Monetary Policy measures undertaken by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is the so-called quantitative easing (QE), which includes the introduction 
of the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO). Such measures, announced on 
the 5th of June 2014, by the ECB Governing Council, are “designed to enhance the functioning 
of the Monetary Policy transmission mechanism by supporting bank lending to the real 
economy” (Draghi, 2014a). 
Specifically, we study the transmission of the TLTRO to the bank credit supply, in order 
to assess if the liquidity obtained from these operations has met the essence of its main goal, 
namely if banks have used this liquidity to increase the credit granted to the real economy. To 
measure the impact of the TLTRO, we estimate the impact of these operations on the credit 
granted by the banking sector to the real economy. Our study encompasses two analyses: an 
analysis for the Euro area, studying the impact on the amount of bank credit supply and a more 
detailed analysis for Portugal, considering not only the amounts but also the cost of credit.  
For the Euro area analysis, we assess the transmission of the TLTRO to the amount of 
credit granted to the real economy. To do so, we study the evolution of the stock of credit 
between the 30th of April 2014 and the 31st of January 2018, using an OLS empirical regression 
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with bank fixed effects. First, we find a positive association between the TLTRO and the amount 
of credit granted to the real economy for vulnerable countries in 2016 and 2017, showing that 
the TLTRO had a positive and significant impact on the stock of credit, which means that banks 
in vulnerable countries used part of the money borrowed in the TLTRO to grant credit to the 
real economy in these years. Moreover, for the group of small banks, we find that the TLTRO 
had a higher impact in less vulnerable countries, showing that the transmission of the Monetary 
Policy was more effective in these countries. Second, we assess how competition in the banking 
sector affects the transmission between the TLTRO and the stock of credit, using the Herfindahl 
Index of market concentration per country. According to the results, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between market concentration in the banking sector and the transmission 
of the TLTRO to the bank credit supply. 
For the specific case of Portugal, we consider the period between 2011 and 2018 and 
estimate the transmission of the TLTRO to the amount of credit granted to the real economy and 
the pass-through of its favourable interest rates to bank loan interest rates. We use a difference-
in-differences OLS regression with bank and time fixed effects, introducing a control group 
composed by the Monetary Policy counterparties that did not participate in the TLTRO. Our 
results suggest that there is no statistically significant association between the TLTRO and the 
amount of credit granted to the real economy. In contrast, we find a negative and statistically 
significant impact of the TLTRO on the cost of credit in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, interest rates 
of loans granted by treated banks are on average, approximately, 1.67 basis points lower relative 
to control banks, and the effects of the TLTRO on the cost of credit have increased from 2016 
to 2017. Also, the difference between treated and control banks is higher for the group of small 
banks, indicating that the transmission of the TLTRO to the cost of credit was stronger for these 
banks. The results on the transmission of the TLTRO to loan interest rates suggest a correct 
functioning of the Monetary Policy transmission mechanism. Therefore, the results demonstrate 
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that the TLTRO have contributed to the well-functioning of the Monetary Policy transmission 
mechanism. 
Hence, our contribution to the literature includes notably: i) the effects of the 
unconventional Monetary Policy on the amount of bank credit supply; ii) the pass-through of 
the Central Bank borrowing rate to the real economy lending interest rates in Portugal; iii) the 
analysis of the relation between competition in the banking sector and Monetary Policy in the 
Euro area. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the background 
of the TLTRO. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Section 4 summarises the data. Section 
5 explains the methodology used to perform this analysis. Section 6 presents the empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND 
a. Unconventional Monetary Policy measures 
Following the GFC, the ECB implemented the first unconventional Monetary Policy 
measures, including the fixed-rate full allotment (FRFA) in the Open Market Operations 
(OMO), meaning that under an interest rate fixed by the ECB, considering that counterparties 
have enough eligible collateral available, their bids are fully satisfied), a new LTRO with one-
year maturity (1-year LTRO) and the first purchase programme of covered bonds (CBPP1). In 
2010, with the sovereign debt crisis in several euro area countries, the ECB introduced the first 
purchase programme of public and private debt securities, the Securities Market Programme 
(SMP). Between 2011 and 2012, with the intensification of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB 
implemented the second purchase programme of covered bonds (CBPP2), two new LTROs with 
three-year maturity (3-year LTRO), reduced the minimum reserve requirement coefficient from 
2% to 1%, lowered the interest rate on the deposit facility to 0% and announced the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme. Moreover, regarding the eligible collateral in the 
OMO, the compliance with the minimum rating level was suspended in the case of securities 
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issued or guaranteed by the Government and bank loans (additional bank loans on individual 
and aggregated bases) started to be accepted (Banco de Portugal, 2017).  
In 2014, the Euro deflation crisis led the ECB to implement a new set of unconventional 
Monetary Policy measures, the so-called QE, which included the establishment of a negative 
interest rate on the deposit facility, the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP), consisting 
in four purchase programmes: Asset-Backed Securities (ABSPP), Covered Bonds (CBPP3), 
Public Sector Debt (PSPP) and Corporate Sector Debt (CSPP) and the TLTRO. Along with this 
set of measures, forward QE guidance was disclosed to the market, not only on the ECB official 
interest rates, expected to remain at low levels for a considerable period of time, but also on the 
ECB willingness to increase the extent and/or the duration of APP, in case a less favourable 
outlook would occur or an unwarranted tightening of the financial conditions would arise. These 
unconventional measures, besides injecting liquidity in the economy, were also implemented to 
achieve the main ECB goal of an inflation rate below, but close to, 2% over the medium term 
(Banco de Portugal, 2017; Draghi, 2014b; ECB/2015/10). 
The unconventional Monetary Policy measures were responsible for containing 
sovereign yield spreads, in relation to German yields, for the Euro area, after the 2008-2009 
GFC and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis (Afonso and Kazemi, 2018). Besides that, these 
measures resulted in the expansion of the ECB balance sheet, reducing the responsiveness of 
the sovereign yield spreads to their fundamental determinants (Afonso et al, 2018).  
b. Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) 
The TLTRO are longer-term refinancing operations, with the specific target of 
supporting the bank lending to the real economy, contributing to the well-functioning of the 
Monetary Policy transmission mechanism (Draghi, 2014a). The amounts that credit institutions 
can borrow on these operations are linked to their eligible credit granted to both non-financial 
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corporations and households1, excluding lending for house purchase, in all currencies, for the 
Euro area residents. Banks either were able to participate in these operations individually or 
associated in a banking group, domestic or cross-border. In the case of a cross-border banking 
group, the lead institution participates in the TLTRO based on the eligible net lending of all 
banks included in the group, allocating all the credit granted by the banks incorporated in the 
group to the jurisdiction of the lead institution (ECB, 2014).  
The TLTRO had two series: the first one, announced on the 5th of June 2015 and 
implemented between the 24th of September 2014 and the 29th of June 2016, through 8 quarterly 
operations, where the interest rate was indexed to the Main Refinancing Operation (MRO) at 
the settlement date and the second series, announced on the 10th of March 2016 and implemented 
between the 29th of June 2016 and the 29th of March 2017 (TLTRO-II), through 4 quarterly 
operations, as illustrated in Figure 1. For the second series, the interest rate applied was 
dependent on the evolution of the net lending from the 1st of February 2015 to the 31st of January 
2018, ranging from a minimum equivalent to the deposit facility rate at the bidding date (-0.4%) 
to a maximum of the MRO rate (0%) (ECB/2014/34; ECB/2016/10).  
[Figure 1] 
The two series of the TLTRO injected a total amount of EUR 1 172 billion in the Euro 
area banks, through 849 banks representing 46% of the Euro area banking system, assessed by 
its total assets. Although the second series has provided EUR 740 billion, the total net injection 
was only EUR 336 billion, due to the substitution effect between the two, profiting from a better 
interest rate of the second series. As illustrated in Chart 1, in the end of 2017, the outstanding 
amount of the TLTRO represents around 99% of the total outstanding amount of the OMO. 
[Chart 1] 
                                                      
1 Households include non-profit institutions serving households. 
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In addition, specifically in Portugal, the TLTRO have injected a total amount of EUR 33 
billion, through 17 banks. The second series has also had a higher demand, providing EUR 21 
billion, albeit the net injection was only EUR 10 billion, considering the substitution effect 
between TLTRO and TLTRO-II. Similarly, as Chart 2 illustrates, in the end of 2017, the 
outstanding amount of the TLTRO represents the total outstanding amount borrowed by 
Portuguese counterparties in the OMO. 
[Chart 2] 
3. LITERATURE 
The effects of the TLTRO have not yet been largely studied in the existing literature, 
mostly due to the recent character of these operations. However, the 3-year LTROs, 
implemented between the 21st of December 2011 and the 29th of February 2012, have already 
been the object of several academic researches. These operations have provided EUR 1 019 
billion to 800 Euro area banks and were described as “credit support measures to support bank 
lending and liquidity in the Euro area money market” (ECB/2012/18). 
When analysing the effects of the 3-year LTRO, using a panel-VAR (vector 
autoregression) for the Euro area countries with information from the BLS, Darracq-Paries and 
Santis (2013) concluded that 3-year LTRO gave a significant contribution to the improvement 
of the real GDP projections and to the credit granted to non-financial corporations, supporting 
the provision of bank lending and avoiding a sudden dry-up of credit supply. Nevertheless, the 
authors also analyse the transmission to the real economy, concluding that 3-year LTRO seem 
to have resulted more in a quantitative credit easing than in a lower cost of financing.  
Carpinelli and Crosignani (2017) show that banks exposed to the foreign wholesale 
market reduced their credit supply during the period of funding stress and restored their credit 
supply once the Central Bank injected liquidity into the system through the 3-year LTRO, albeit 
a significant fraction of the Central Bank liquidity was used to increase holdings of high-yield 
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securities, mainly for the banks less affected by the wholesale funding dry-up, using the funds 
to reach-for-yield.  
In addition, Andrade et al (2015) study the impact of the 3-year LTRO in France and 
concluded that banks seized the opportunity to replace their short-term financing with a longer-
term Central Bank borrowing, showing that 3-year LTRO worked via the bank lending channel 
when banks were financially constrained, allowing an increase on their lending to firms with 
intensive margin by the use of their 3-year LTRO uptakes. Jasova et al (2018) analyse the impact 
of the 3-year LTROs in Portugal and show that its extended maturity had a positive and 
economically sizable impact on the credit granted to the real economy. Additionally, the authors 
also show that 3-year LTRO had a policy side effect, as banks used this liquidity to purchase 
more securities and therefore partially replaced the lending to the real economy. 
In June 2014, the ECB announced the TLTRO, with the specific target of supporting the 
credit granted by the banking system. These operations were specifically designed to give banks 
the incentive to increase loans to non-financial corporations and households (except lending for 
house purchase), since the borrowing limits of these collateralised cash loans were a function of 
their net lending. In the TLTRO-II, not only the borrowing limits but also its interest rate 
depended on their net lending, what contributes to a better functioning of the Monetary Policy 
transmission mechanism (ECB/2016/10).  
In fact, the conditions of the TLTRO are a key aspect for its success. For instance, banks 
seem to prefer a longer-term refinancing rather than a roll-over of short-term Monetary Policy 
refinancing operations, not only due to the uncertainty on the maintenance of the FRFA in the 
OMO over the subsequent years, but also for regulatory reasons, for instance longer-term 
operations contributes to the fulfilment of the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) (Renne, 2014). 
When analysing the bank lending survey (BLS), addressed to a representative sample of 
Euro area banks in order to improve the knowledge of the Euro area bank lending behaviour, 
we concluded that responses are quite similar for both series of TLTRO (TLTRO and TLTRO-
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II). Among the reasons presented by the Euro area banks to participate in these longer-term 
operations, the most commonly referred was its attractive conditions (profitability motive), 
along with the reduction of the current difficulties and/or the prevention of future ones 
(precautionary motive) and, in a small extent, the enhancement of the regulatory liquidity 
requirements fulfilment (namely the NSFR). On the other hand, Euro area banks indicated the 
absence of fund constraints as the main reason for not participating in TLTRO, but also the 
concerns about insufficient loan demand (the fulfilment of the required TLTRO net lending 
benchmark), capital and collateral constraints, as well as concerns about market stigma. The 
Euro area banks that participated in the TLTRO used the funds to grant loans to non-financial 
corporations and households, to substitute maturing debt and interbank lending, as well as to 
replace other Eurosystem refinancing operations, namely the 3-years LTRO. Banks indicated 
that the TLTRO contributed to the improvement of not only the credit supply, but also its terms 
and conditions, especially for non-financial corporations (ECB, 2017a; ECB, 2017b).  
Balfoussia and Gibson (2015) conclude that there is a significant impact of the TLTRO 
on the real economy activity, both for the Euro area as a whole and for the specific case of 
Greece, via an easing of the financial conditions, affecting several real economy indicators, 
verified as positive and significant, and possibly resulting in an overall economic growth 
increase. The authors used a financial conditions index (FCI) developed by Angelopoulou et al 
(2013), which includes a wide range of prices, quantities, spreads and survey data, in line with 
the economic theory followed by the authors, combined with a VAR framework, in order to 
estimate the potential impact of TLTRO on several economic activity aspects.  
Benetton and Fantino (2018) estimate the effect of the TLTRO on the price of credit for 
Italy, concluding that bidder banks lowered their loan interest rates by, approximately, 20 basis 
points relative to the banks that did not participate in these operations. The authors also show 




In 2017, the ECB presented two Economic Bulletins, including the evolution of both the 
amounts and lending rates of the credit granted to non-financial corporations, for the Euro area, 
showing that the two series of TLTRO have resulted in more attractive credit conditions. Bidder 
banks located in vulnerable countries have lowered their interest rates more than banks that did 
not participate in these operations (non-bidders). Therefore, vulnerable countries had a stronger 
response to the TLTRO than less vulnerable ones, which contributed to a lower dispersion of 
banking lending rates, resulting in a reduction of the fragmentation of the Eurosystem financing 
conditions. Additionally, banks with high levels of excess liquidity verified significant increases 
in credit volumes (ECB, 2017c). For less vulnerable countries, the stock of credit has increased 
for bidder banks and was kept relatively stable for non-bidders. In the case of vulnerable 
countries, non-bidder banks verified a significant decrease in intermediation amounts, while, for 
bidders, the decline was smoother (ECB, 2017d).  
Therefore, our work contributes to three strands of literature. First, we study the 
transmission of Monetary Policy to credit supply (Agarwal et al, 2015; Jiménez et al, 2012; 
Jiménez et al, 2014), in particular the effects of the unconventional Monetary Policy on the 
amount of credit supply (Chakraborty et al, 2016; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Di Maggio et al, 
2014; Khwaja and Mian, 2008). We aim at assessing how a positive funding shock, namely a 
Central Bank liquidity injection, impacts the credit supply of banks (Andrade et al, 2015; 
Carpinelli and Crosignani, 2017; Schnabl, 2012). Second, for the Portuguese case we study the 
pass-through of the Central Bank borrowing rate to the real economy lending rates (Benetton 
and Fantino, 2018; Cottarelli et al, 1995; van Leuvensteijn et al, 2008). Finally, for the Euro 
area we analyse the relation between competition and Monetary Policy (Berger and Hannan, 
1989; de Graeve et al, 2007; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992), in particular the relation between 




To perform our analysis at the Euro area level, we used confidential data on credit 
granted by bank or banking group to non-financial corporations and households, excluding 
lending for house purchase, for all the Euro area countries. These data include the initial 
outstanding amount of credit and quarterly net lending amounts, which allowed us to calculate 
eligible stock of credit by quarter. Moreover, we also included confidential data about the 
participation in the TLTRO and early repayments by bank or banking group.  
These data consist of individual loan-level bank information between the 30th of April 
2014 and the 31st of January 2018, for the 19 countries of the Euro area: Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece 
(GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI) and Slovakia (SK). For the first series of 
TLTRO, the data were reported on a quarterly basis (from the 30th of April 2014 to the 30th of 
April 2016), albeit for the second series, banks had only two reporting periods (from the 1st of 
February 2015 to the 31st January 2016 and from the 1st of February 2016 to the 31st January 
2018). Therefore, for the latter period, as we only had the initial stock and the net lending during 
the period, we divided the eligible net lending into quarters to construct the quarterly panel, 
assuming the growth of the stock of credit was linear during the period. 
For the control variables, we used the Moody’s Analytics BankFocus database that 
provides year-end data, by bank, for the chosen variables: total assets value, loans over assets 
ratio, bad loans over loans ratio and capital ratio (Common Equity Tier 1 ratio, included in 
Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU and Common Requirements Regulation 575/2013, 
transposed to the European Union from the Basel III global standards on bank capital).  
In total, 849 banks and banking groups participated in the TLTRO. However, there are 
some considerations regarding the composition of the final sample. For instance, bidder banks 
that have been merged or acquired by another bidder bank during the period under analysis were 
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integrated in the respective merging or acquiring bank, since the outstanding amounts of the 
TLTRO were transferred to the new owner in these cases. Additionally, banks that did not have 
available information for the control variables, for example branches that participated through 
the National Central Bank (NCB) of its location, but its financial statement is integrated in the 
financial statement of its headquarters, were withdrawn from the sample. Moreover, banks that 
went bankrupt during this period were kept in the sample, albeit with data only up to the date of 
the bankruptcy. Lastly, the final sample has 749 banks. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock of credit, granted by bank  at time . 
The stock of credit was on average around EUR 4 919 million, although the dataset includes 
amounts of credit between EUR 19 and 104 056 million. The stock of credit variable was 
winsorised at 1% level, to account for the outliers in the sample.  
[Table 1] 
The average outstanding amount in the TLTRO was EUR 656 million. During the 12 
operations in total of both TLTRO and TLTRO-II, several banks have repaid in advance some 
of the borrowed amounts, for various motives, such as the more attractive interest rates applied 
to the last operations when compared to the first ones. For this reason, we used the outstanding 
amounts instead of the total take-up.   
The Herfindahl index refers to the market concentration and was obtained by summing 
the squares of the market shares of all the credit institutions in the banking sector of the country. 
The exact formula according to which banks must report the data to the ECB is described in the 
ECB Guideline on monetary and financial statistics (ECB/2014/15)2. The credit market in the 
                                                      
2 The Herfindahl Index is obtained by summing the squares of the market shares of all the Credit Institutions (CI) 
in the banking sector and must be reported to the ECB in accordance with the following formula: 
 = ∑ (
	

) , where  s the number of CI in the country,   represents the total assets of   and  = ∑ 

  
represents the total assets of all CI of the country. 
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Euro area is quite competitive, as the average value of the index is 0.049, with values ranging 
between 0.025 and 0.363, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2] 
Finally, we used the main structural characteristics of the banks as control variables. 
Banks had on average EUR 31 719 million of total assets, about 59.7% of the total assets being 
loans, from which 5.7% are bad loans (impaired or non-performing loans), representing quite a 
low risk of the credit portfolio. The capital adequacy is measured by the capital ratio, according 
to the Basel III rules, which is on average 14.5%.  
As the data are confidential at country level, we aggregated it, classifying the countries 
into two groups, according to ECB Economic Bulletins approach (ECB, 2017c; ECB, 2017d): 
vulnerable (CY, ES, GR, IE, IT, PT and SI) and less vulnerable (AT, BE, DE, EE, FI, FR, LT, 
LU, LV, MT, NL and SK) countries. The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
dataset for the two groups of countries are presented in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
Chart 3 shows the evolution of bank lending to non-financial corporations and 
households (except lending for house purchase), using an index equal to 1 in June 2014, prior 
to the announcement of the TLTRO.  
 [Chart 3] 
Overall, Euro area banks increased the amount of credit granted by 14% since June 2014. 
However, while in less vulnerable countries bank lending has increased by 19% since June 2014, 
in vulnerable countries the growth was only by 7% in the same period.  
We also performed a more detailed analysis for Portugal, using Balance Sheet 
Information (BSI) and Monetary Interest Rate (MIR) databases reported by the Portuguese 
banks to the Statistics Department of Banco de Portugal, within the same abovementioned dates, 
for all the Monetary Policy counterparties established in Portugal. The sample was restricted to 
the Monetary Policy counterparties, instead of all banks, because only these banks have had 
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access to the TLTRO. These data include monthly outstanding amounts of credit, adjustments 
to loan sales and purchases, as well as other loan transfers, plus other adjustments (currency 
revaluations, write-offs/write-downs and credit reclassifications), which allowed us to calculate 
eligible stocks of credit and net lending amounts for the TLTRO. Additionally, we study if the 
financing conditions have improved during the period of the TLTRO, using the loan rates 
applied to new credit operations (annualised agreed rate). 
For the case study of Portugal, we introduced a control group composed by the Monetary 
Policy counterparties that did not participate in the TLTRO and a period before the 
implementation of these operations. Thus, we compared the evolution of both the amounts of 
credit granted and the cost of credit applied by bidder banks (treated group) and non-bidder 
banks (control group), for the periods before (from February 2011 to May 2014) and after the 
announcement of the TLTRO (from June 2014 to January 2018). The descriptive statistics of 
the variables in the dataset for all the Monetary Policy counterparties are presented in Table 3. 
[Table 3], [Table 4] 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset, 
comparing the banks that have participated in at least one TLTRO operation (treated) with the 
other banks (control), in the periods before and after the announcement of the TLTRO in June 
2014. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock of credit, granted by bank  
at time . The stock of credit and the interest rates variables were winsorised at 1% level, to 
account for the presence of outliers in the sample. 
The stock of credit decreased, on average, between the periods before and after the 
TLTRO, for both groups, although the reduction in relative terms was higher in the control group 
(30% comparing with 8% for the treated group). The interest rate was, on average, higher in the 
treated group, mainly due to the characteristics of the participant banks, but decreased in both 
groups between the two periods. The 17 Portuguese banks that participated in the TLTRO had, 
on average, EUR 752 million of outstanding amount in the TLTRO.  
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The treated group is, on average, composed by larger banks (EUR 22 770 million of total 
assets) than control group (EUR 1 359 million of total assets), although the other bank specific 
characteristics are quite similar. 
Besides the improved financial conditions offered to the Euro area banks, TLTRO have 
been designed to pass its favourable borrowing conditions to the credit granted to non-financial 
corporations and households. Charts 4 and 5 depict the aggregate evolution for the group of 
banks that have borrowed from TLTRO and/or TLTRO-II (bidders) and the group of banks that 
have accessed neither of the two (non-bidders). 
[Chart 4], [Chart 5] 
Chart 4 shows the evolution of the credit granted to non-financial corporations and 
households (except lending for house purchase), using an index equal to 1 in June 2014, the 
announcement of the TLTRO. For the Portuguese banks, TLTRO seem to have prevented the 
slowdown in credit volumes visible in non-bidder banks. Therefore, bidder banks broadly 
maintained the stock of credit between June 2014 and January 2018, while non-bidder banks 
decreased the stock of credit by, approximately, 41%. 
Due to the benefits associated with these operations, banks had the incentive to increase 
the amount of credit granted to the real economy, which has also led to interest rates that are 
more favourable. The evidence suggests that bidder banks lowered their loan interest rates by 
more than non-bidder banks, as Chart 5 shows.  Although non-bidders presented, on average, 
lower interest rates in the beginning of the TLTRO compared to bidder banks, the decrease in 
loan interest rates during the period under analysis was only by 1.3 basis points, while bidder 
banks decreased their loan interest rates by 2.7 basis points since June 2014. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
a. Euro area 
To analyse the data, we use a panel data approach. We construct a quarterly balanced 
panel for 749 banks and 15 periods, between the 30th of April 2014 and the 31st of January 2018. 
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Panel data has several advantages relevant to our empirical analysis, as it allows for more 
information, more variability, less collinearity, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency 
(Baltagi, 2005). 
We include time varying coefficients to capture the dynamics of the transmission of the 
TLTRO to the credit granted and clustered the standard errors by bank: 
(1)  ,, =  +  + ∑  , + !,," + #,, 
where ,, is the natural logarithm of the stock of credit, granted by bank , in country $, in 
period ,  , is the natural logarithm of the TLTRO outstanding amount of bank  at 
quarter ,  are bank fixed effects,  is a dummy variable equal to 1 when  corresponds to 
year  (=2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) and #,, is an error term. These variables were also 
complemented with control variables, deemed relevant to explain net lending, as each bank has 
its own individual characteristics affecting the dependent variable. Hence, , are bank 
controls3, specifically the value of total assets, the loans over assets ratio, the bad loans over 
loans ratio and the capital ratio.  
To identify how the competition in the banking sector affects the transmission of the 
TLTRO to the stock of credit, we add an interaction term to equation (1): 
(2)  , ,  =  +  + ∑  ,  + ∑ % ,   + !,," +
#, , 
where the  is the Herfindahl Index for credit institutions in country $. The interaction 
between  , and  measures the effects of the competition on the transmission of the 
unconventional Monetary Policy to the real economy. We also included bank fixed effects, in 
order to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at bank level. 
                                                      




To analyse the data for Portugal, we construct a monthly balanced panel for 35 banks 
and 84 periods, between the 1st of February 2011 and the 1st of January 2018. We performed 
two distinct analyses: the transmission of the TLTRO to the stock of credit and to the cost of 
credit. However, for Portugal we did not apply the Herfindahl index for the regional market of 
the loans, as the credit conditions are similar across the country. The analyses were performed 
using a difference-in-differences OLS regression for the balanced panel. Nonetheless, as the 
participation on the TLTRO was a choice of banks, the selection of the treatment group might 
present some endogeneity. However, the borrowing limit in these operations was a proportion 
of the stock of credit granted to non-financial corporations and households (except lending for 
house purchase) in a defined period before the TLTRO, so the identified endogeneity is therefore 
reduced. Furthermore, there might be confounding effects and endogeneity arising from the 
design of the policy itself that may affect the results. Therefore, the estimates should be 
interpreted having these caveats in mind. 
First, we estimate the transmission of the TLTRO to the amount of credit granted by the 
banking sector to the real economy. We included time varying coefficients to capture the 
dynamics of the transmission of the TLTRO to the stock of credit and clustered the standard 
errors by bank. Therefore, the OLS empirical regression is: 
(3)  , = & +  + '()* + ∑  ,  + +,," + !," + #,  
where , is the natural logarithm of the stock of credit of bank , in period , ,, is the 
weighted average interest rate applied by bank  at time  in the previous month to new credit 
operations, 

 are bank fixed effects,  ()* is a dummy equal to 1 when  corresponds to the 
TLTRO period,  is a dummy variable equal to 1 when  corresponds to year  (=2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017) and  #, is an error term. These variables were complemented with time-
varying control variables, deemed relevant to explain the stock of credit, representing bank 
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individual characteristics that affect the dependent variable. Hence, , are bank controls, 
namely the value of total assets, the loans over assets ratio, the bad loans over loans ratio and 
the government bonds over assets ratio. The amounts relate to the month prior to month . 
The term  , is the treatment variable. First, we estimate a specification where the 
TLTRO variable is a dummy variable equal to one after the announcement of the policy if the 
bank has participated in the TLTRO, correspondent to the binary treatment. Second, we estimate 
an alternative specification with a continuous treatment, where the TLTRO variable, instead of 
a dummy, is the natural logarithm of the TLTRO outstanding amount, which measures the 
intensity of the treatment.  
Second, we analyse the pass-through of the favourable interest rates of the TLTRO to 
the loan interest rates applied by banks to the real economy. We also include time varying 
coefficients to capture the dynamics of the transmission mechanism and cluster the standard 
errors by bank. The OLS empirical regression is: 
 (4)  ,, = & +  + '()* + ∑  ,  + !," + #,  
where ,, is the weighted average interest rate applied by bank , in period  in the previous 
month to new credit operations, 

 are bank fixed effects, ()* is a dummy equal to 1 when 
 corresponds to the TLTRO period,  , is the treatment variable,  is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when  corresponds to year  (=2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) and  #, is an error 
term. These variables were also complemented with the same time-varying control variables, 
,, such as the value of total assets, the loans over assets ratio, the bad loans over loans ratio 




a. Euro area 
i. The effects on the amount of credit 
The first set of empirical results identifies the impact of the TLTRO on the stock of credit 
granted to the real economy. Table 5 shows the results for the OLS regression, controlling for 
bank fixed effects and clustered the standard errors by bank. Column (1) presents the results for 
all the Euro area banks, controlling for bank-specific characteristics. We do not find a 
statistically significant association between the TLTRO and credit granted to the real economy, 
even though there is some heterogeneity. 
In columns (2) and (3), we divide the Euro area countries into less vulnerable and 
vulnerable countries. For the less vulnerable countries, the coefficients of the TLTRO 
outstanding are also not statistically significant. Nevertheless, for the vulnerable countries, the 
coefficients of the TLTRO are positive and statistically significant in 2016 and 2017. Thus, the 
results indicate that, in 2016 and 2017, banks in vulnerable countries used part of the money 
borrowed in the TLTRO to increase the credit granted to the real economy. Moreover, the 
coefficient increases from 2016 to 2017, which means that the effects of the TLTRO may have 
increased in these years. Furthermore, the  for vulnerable countries and small banks is much 
higher than in all the other specifications.  
[Table 5] 
Additionally, we divide the sample of banks in the two groups of countries into large and 
small banks, assessed by its total assets. Thus, banks were considered as large banks if its amount 
of total assets was, on average, higher than or equal to EUR 1 000 million and as small banks, 
otherwise.  
Table 6 shows the results for the OLS regression, controlling for bank fixed effects and 
clustered the standard errors by bank. Columns (3) and (4) show that, in less vulnerable 
countries, TLTRO are positively associated with the stock of credit, although only marginally 
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statistically significant for the small banks in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Columns (6) and (7) also 
show that the coefficients of the TLTRO are positive and statistically significant in 2016 and 
2017 for both large and small banks located in vulnerable countries. For group of large banks in 
vulnerable countries, the coefficients are increasing from 2016 to 2017. Furthermore, for the 
group of small banks, the effects are also increasing from 2016 to 2017 in vulnerable countries, 
as well as from 2014 to 2016 in less vulnerable countries and seem to be higher in less vulnerable 
countries, which indicates that the transmission worked better in these countries. The results 
also seem to suggest that, in vulnerable countries, the effects of the TLTRO were higher in small 
banks. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the APP in 2014 arises several confounding effects, 
which might be contributing to the reduced effects of the TLTRO on the stock of credit. In fact, 
the APP was the major responsible for the significant excess liquidity growth verified for the 
Euro area banks and therefore to increase the credit granted to the real economy (Andrade et al, 
2016; Baldo et al, 2017). 
[Table 6] 
The results for the Euro area suggest that the increase in the stock of credit illustrated in 
Chart 3 was in part explained by the liquidity injected through the TLTRO. Moreover, when 
splitting into vulnerable and less vulnerable countries, the results also show that the behaviour 
of the stock of credit illustrated in Chart 3, as well as in ECB (2017d), can also be in part 
explained by the TLTRO. The results also show a stronger correlation between the TLTRO and 
the stock of credit for less vulnerable countries, which is also in line with Chart 3 and ECB 
(2017d). Moreover, the results are also in line with the BLS, in which banks have mentioned 
that only used part of the liquidity borrowed from the TLTRO to grant credit (ECB, 2017a; ECB, 
2017b). Therefore, even though of very small magnitude, the impact is estimated to be positive. 
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ii. The effects of competition in the banking sector 
The second set of empirical results identifies how the competition affects this 
transmission between the TLTRO and the stock of credit. The coefficient captures the 
interaction between the TLTRO and bank competition assessed by the Herfindahl Index of the 
country. Table 7 presents the results for the OLS regression, controlling for bank fixed effects 
and clustered the standard errors by bank. Hence, the results do not show a statistically 
significant role for market concentration on the transmission of the TLTRO to the stock of credit, 
as the effects are not statistically significant. Therefore, the estimates suggest that the 
transmission of the TLTRO to the real economy did not depend on market concentration in the 
banking sector. 
[Table 7]  
b. Portugal 
i. The effects on the amount of credit 
The first set of empirical results identifies the correlation between the TLTRO and the 
stock of credit granted to the real economy, namely non-financial corporations and households 
(except lending for house purchase).  
Table 8 presents the results on the effects of the TLTRO on the stock of credit granted, 
controlling for bank and time fixed effects and clustering the standard errors by bank. Column 
(1) shows the results for all Portuguese banks, but the effects are not statistically significant. 
[Table 8] 
Additionally, we divide the Portuguese Monetary Policy counterparties sample in large 
and small banks, assessed by its total assets. Thus, banks were considered as large banks if its 
amount of total assets was, on average, higher than or equal to EUR 1 000 million and as small 
banks, otherwise. Hence, both the treated group and the control group were adjusted accordingly 
to divide the sample into large and small banks. Among the 35 banks in the sample, 20 were 
classified as large banks, 12 of which have participated in the TLTRO. The remaining 15 banks 
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were considered small banks, 5 of which have participated in the TLTRO. Column (2) and (3) 
present the results for the sample of large banks and small banks, respectively, but the effects 
are not statistically significant. 
In the continuous treatment case, we substitute the TLTRO dummy variable by the 
natural logarithm of the actual outstanding amount borrowed from the TLTRO. The results are 
also not statistically significant. 
Hence, the results suggest that there is no statistically significant association between the 
TLTRO and the amount of credit granted to the real economy. The lack of significant results 
might be explained by the implementation of the APP in 2014, which had a huge impact on 
excess liquidity amounts held by the Euro area banks and, consequently, on the stock of credit 
(Andrade et al, 2016; Baldo et al, 2017). According to Chart 4, in the last quarter of 2015 and 
again in the last quarter of 2017, non-bidder banks decreased the stock of credit, while bidder 
banks maintained the stock of credit relatively constant. This behaviour might be explained by 
a stronger effect of the APP in bidder banks, due its specific characteristics, for instance being, 
on average, larger banks, and not necessarily due to the liquidity injected through the TLTRO. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude about the transmission of the TLTRO to the amount of bank 
credit supply. 
ii. The effects on the cost of credit 
The second set of empirical results identifies the correlation between the TLTRO and 
the cost of credit. We also estimate both specifications, the binary treatment, where the TLTRO 
variable is a dummy variable equal to one after the announcement of the policy if the bank has 
participated in the TLTRO, and the continuous treatment, measuring the intensity of the 
treatment, where the TLTRO variable is the natural logarithm of the TLTRO outstanding 
amount. 
Table 9 presents the results on the effects of the TLTRO on the cost of credit, controlling 
for bank and time fixed effects and clustering the standard errors by bank. In column (1), we 
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estimate the model on the full sample of banks and the effects are statistically significant. 
Treated banks decreased its loan rates relative to control banks and the effects are statistically 
significant in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, interest rates set by banks that have borrowed from the 
TLTRO are on average, approximately, 1.67 basis points lower relative to control banks. 
[Table 9] 
We also divide the Portuguese Monetary Policy counterparties sample into large and 
small banks, assessed by the amount of its total assets. The effects of the TLTRO in the cost of 
credit was higher for small banks, suggesting a pass-through in these banks. In column (2), we 
estimate the OLS regression on the sample of large banks. The results are statistically significant 
for all the periods under analysis, verifying our previous conclusion of an increase in the effect 
of TLTRO along the years. In 2017, loan interest rates of treated banks were on average, 
approximately, 1.63 basis points lower relative to control banks. Finally, in column (3) we 
perform the same analysis for the small banks, showing that the effects of the TLTRO were 
higher for this group of banks when comparing treated and control banks. The results are only 
statistically significant in 2016 and 2017 and show that, in 2017, interest rates set by treated 
banks are on average, approximately, 2.95 basis points lower than those set by control banks. 
In the continuous treatment, we substitute the TLTRO dummy variable by the natural 
logarithm of the TLTRO outstanding amounts. The results are only statistically significant in 
2016 and 2017 and show that TLTRO had a positive impact on the cost of credit in these years. 
Similarly to the binary treatment, the impact was stronger on small banks. 
Overall, the results suggest a positive and significant transmission of the TLTRO to the 
cost of credit in 2016 and 2017. Furthermore, the difference in the loan interest rates between 
treated and control banks increased since the beginning of the TLTRO, which could be explained 
by the introduction of the TLTRO-II in March 2016, which had the interest rate incentive and 
so the amount of net lending was used not only to determine the borrowing allowance, but also 
the interest rate applied to these operations, ranging from the MRO rate to the deposit facility 
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rate (from 0% to -0.4%, respectively), which might led to a decrease in loan interest rates in 
order to increase the amount of credit granted to the real economy. These results suggest that 
the decrease in loan interest rates by treated banks illustrated in Chart 5 can be explained by the 
introduction of the TLTRO. Therefore, since its implementation in 2014, treated banks 
decreased its loan rates in relation to control banks, thereby reducing the difference between 
both groups of banks observed in the beginning of the TLTRO. The results on the effects of the 
TLTRO on the cost of credit suggest a correct functioning of Monetary Policy transmission 
mechanism, by the pass-through of the favourable interest rates applied in the TLTRO to the 
loan rates applied to the real economy.  
The results on the functioning of the Monetary Policy transmission mechanism are in 
line with the existing literature, particularly the Balfoussia and Gibson (2015) analysis, which 
find an easing of the financial conditions resulted from the TLTRO, for both the Euro area and 
Greece and the Benetton and Fantino (2018) study, which find a decrease in loan interest rates 
by treated banks in relation to control banks, for the Italian case. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We have assessed the transmission of the unconventional Monetary Policy measures to 
bank credit supply, by studying the relationship between the TLTRO and the credit granted by 
the banking system to non-financial corporations and households (except lending for house 
purchase).  
First, we perform an analysis for the Euro area, using an OLS empirical regression on a 
quarterly balanced panel. We find a positive correlation between the TLTRO and the stock of 
credit in 2016 and 2017 for the vulnerable countries and in 2014, 2015 and 2016 for the less 
vulnerable countries, which means that banks used part of the money borrowed in the TLTRO 
to grant credit to the real economy. We also find that, for the group of small banks, TLTRO had 
a higher impact in less vulnerable countries, showing that the transmission worked better in 
these countries. Additionally, we assessed how the competition in the banking sector affects the 
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transmission between TLTRO and the stock of credit, using the Herfindahl Index per country, 
which measures the market concentration of banking business. The results do not suggest a role 
of market concentration on the transmission of the TLTRO to the stock of credit. 
Second, we perform a specific analysis for Portugal, using a difference-in-differences 
OLS regression on a monthly balanced panel. The results do not suggest a statistically significant 
impact of TLTRO on the amount of credit granted to the real economy. Regarding the effects of 
the TLTRO on credit conditions, we find a statistically significant association between the 
TLTRO and the cost of credit, indicating that treated banks set lower loan interest rates on 
average by, approximately, 1.67 basis points than control banks in 2017. We also find that the 
difference between treated and control banks is higher for the group of small banks in terms of 
the cost of credit. Moreover, the effects of the TLTRO on loan interest rates increased during 
from 2016 to 2017, both in large and small banks.  
The pass-through of TLTRO interest rates to loan interest rates characterises the correct 
functioning of Monetary Policy transmission mechanism, which is the aim of the Monetary 
Policy measures. Therefore, the results show that the TLTRO contributed to the well-
functioning of the Monetary Policy transmission mechanism. 
An interesting avenue for future research on the transmission of unconventional 
Monetary Policy to bank credit supply is the extension of the Euro area analysis, performing a 
similar analysis as the one for Portugal. This study requires additional data, to which we did not 
have had access to, namely for the period before the TLTRO and for the Monetary Policy 
counterparties that did not participate in the TLTRO (control group). Additionally, data on the 
interest rates would also be necessary, to infer the pass-through of the favourable interest rates 
applied to the TLTRO to loan interest rates. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we 
would be able to infer the evolution of both the amounts of credit granted and the loan interest 
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Figure 1: Timeline of the analysis (pre-TLTRO and TLTRO periods) 
The figure illustrates the timeline of the TLTRO. The TLTRO were announced on the 5th of June 2014 
and implemented between the 24th of September 2014 and the 29th of June 2016, through 8 quarterly 
operations, where the interest rate was indexed to the Main Refinancing Operation (MRO) at the 
settlement date and the second series, announced on the 10th of March 2016 and implemented between 
the 29th of June 2016 and the 29th of March 2017 (TLTRO-II), through 4 quarterly operations, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. For the second series, the interest rate applied was dependent on the evolution of 
the net lending from the 1st of February 2015 to the 31st of January 2018, ranging from a minimum 
equivalent to the deposit facility rate at the bidding date (-0.4%) to a maximum of the MRO rate (0%). 


















Figure 2: Geographical distribution of the Herfindahl Index 
The figure represents the geographical distribution of the quartiles of the Herfindahl index in the term 
loan sector. The Herfindahl index refers to the market concentration and is obtained by summing the 
squares of the market shares of all the credit institutions in the banking sector of the country. The credit 
market in the Euro area is quite competitive, with an average value of the index of 0.049 and with values 
ranging between 0.025 and 0.363. 
 
Source: ECB and authors’ calculations. 
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Chart 1: Evolution of Monetary Policy refinancing operations for the Euro area 
The chart illustrates the evolution of the total amount of Monetary Policy refinancing operations 
for the Euro area, decipited by type of operation. In the end of 2017, the outstanding amount of 
the TLTRO represents around 99% of the total outstanding amount of the OMO. 
 
Source: ECB and authors’ calculations.  
 
Chart 2: Evolution of Monetary Policy refinancing operations for Portugal 
The chart illustrates the evolution of the total amount of Monetary Policy refinancing operations for 
Portugal, decipited by type of operation. In the end of 2017, the outstanding amount of the TLTRO 
represents the total outstanding amount borrowed by Portuguese counterparties in the OMO. 
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Chart 3: Evolution of the stock of credit for the Euro area countries 
The chart shows the evolution of the notional stock of loans to non-financial corporations and households 
(except lending for house purchase), using an index equal to 1 in June 2014, prior to the announcement 
of the TLTRO. Represents the aggregate evolution for the group of banks that borrowed from TLTRO-I 
and/or TLTRO-II. Overall, Euro area banks increased the amount of credit granted by 14% since June 
2014. However, while in less vulnerable countries bank lending has increased by 19% since June 2014, 
in vulnerable countries the growth was only by 7% in the same period. 
Source: ECB and authors’ calculations.  
 
 
Chart 4: Evolution of the stock of credit for the Portuguese treated and control banks  
The chart shows the evolution of the notional stock of loans to non-financial corporations and households 
(except lending for house purchase), using an index equal to 1 in June 2014, the announcement of the 
TLTRO. Represents the aggregate evolution for the group of banks that borrowed from TLTRO-I and/or 
TLTRO-II. Bidder banks broadly maintained the stock of credit between June 2014 and January 2018, 
while non-bidder banks decreased the stock of credit by, approximately, 41%. 
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Chart 5: Evolution of loan interest rates for the Portuguese treated and control banks 
The chart shows the evolution of the loan interest rates applied to new credit operations to non-financial 
corporations and households (except lending for house purchase). Represents the aggregate evolution for 
the group of banks that borrowed from TLTRO-I and/or TLTRO-II. The evidence suggests that bidder 
banks lowered their loan interest rates by more than non-bidder banks.  
 
















Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all the Euro area countries 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset, from April 2014 to 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the Euro area vulnerable and less vulnerable countries 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset, from April 2014 to 
January 2018. The Euro area countries are divided into two groups: vulnerable (CY, ES, GR, IE, IT, PT 
and SI) and less vulnerable (AT, BE, DE, EE, FI, FR, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL and SK) countries. The stock 





VARIABLES  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max
Stock of credit (EUR million) 9 337 4 919 14 902 19 104 056
TLTRO (EUR million) 9 337 656 2 924 0 60 920
Herfindahl Index 9 337 0.049 0.044 0.025 0.363
TLTRO*HerfindahI Index 9 337 45 209 0 3 786
Total assets (EUR million) 9 337 31 719 147 420 37 2 077 758
Loans over assets ratio (%) 9 337 59.7 15.4 3.2 95.3
Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 9 337 5.7 9.5 0.0 81.8
Capital ratio (%) 8 650 14.5 4.9 0.5 145.6
EURO AREA
Source: ECB, Moody’s Analytics and authors' calculations.
VARIABLES  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.
Stock of credit (EUR million) 6 527 3 200 11 398 2 810 8 028 18 479
TLTRO (EUR million) 6 527 348 1 802 2 810 1 290 4 340
Herfindahl Index 6 527 0.041 0.045 2 810 0.068 0.036
TLTRO*HerfindahI Index 6 527 23 141 2 810 96 307
Total assets (EUR million) 6 527 25 479 143 000 2 810 35 000 132 000
Loans over assets ratio (%) 6 527 61.3 14.9 2 810 56.2 15.9
Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 6 527 2.4 3.6 2 810 13.5 13.5
Capital ratio (%) 6 112 14.4 4.4 2 538 14.8 5.7
EURO AREA
VULNERABLE COUNTRIESLESS VULNERABLE COUNTRIES
Source: ECB, Moody’s Analytics and authors' calculations.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the Portuguese banks 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset, from February 2011 to 
January 2018. The data include all Monetary Policy counterparties. The stock of credit and the interest 
rates variables were winsorised at 1% level, to account for the outliers in the sample. 
 
  
VARIABLES  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max
Stock of credit (EUR million) 2762 3 580 6 682 1 26 660
Interest Rate (%) 2762 3.8 3.3 0.1 16.2
TLTRO (EUR million) 2762 204 746 0 6 410
Total assets (EUR million) 2762 13 452 26 458 37 118 000
Loans over assets ratio (%) 2762 60.99 23.36 5.698 99.857
Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 2762 4.7 6.2 0.0 109.7
Government bonds over assets ratio (%) 2762 16.3 23.9 0.0 139.4




Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the Portuguese treated and control banks 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset, from February 2011 to 
January 2018. The table compares the banks that have participated in at least one TLTRO operation 
(treated) with the other banks (control), in the periods before and after the announcement of the TLTRO 
in June 2014. The stock of credit and the interest rates variables were winsorised at 1% level, to account 






VARIABLES  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.
Before
   Stock of credit (EUR million) 680 6 914 8 951 640 463 518
   Interest Rate (%) 680 6.1 3.9 640 3.8 3.4
   TLTRO (EUR million) 680 0 0 640 0 0
   Total assets (EUR million) 680 26 628 36 722 640 1 674 2 034
   Loans over assets ratio (%) 680 58.9 16.2 640 67.9 26.2
   Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 680 4.4 3.5 640 5.1 7.8
   Government bonds over assets ratio (%) 680 15.1 18.9 640 10.6 21.2
After
   Stock of credit (EUR million) 748 6 332 7 582 694 325 374
   Interest Rate (%) 748 3.5 2.8 694 2.0 2.2
   TLTRO (EUR million) 748 752 1 282 694 0 0
   Total assets (EUR million) 748 22 770 29 264 694 1 359 1 501
   Loans over assets ratio (%) 748 57.2 16.5 694 60.7 30.4
   Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 748 4.9 4.5 694 4.6 7.8
   Government bonds over assets ratio (%) 748 17.1 15.8 694 21.8 34.4





Table 5: Transmission of TLTRO liquidity to the stock of credit for the Euro area 
The table shows the estimated parameters and the standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (1), 




All countries Less vulnerable countries Vulnerable countries
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Log of TLTRO x
2014 -0.000133 -0.000530 0.000004
(0.000276) (0.000758) (0.000003)
2015 0.000097 -0.000454 0.000006
(0.000251) (0.000929) (0.000004)
2016 0.001095 0.001659 0.000014***
(0.000837) (0.001280) (0.000005)
2017 0.001013 0.001571 0.000021***
(0.000791) (0.001252) (0.000007)
Log of total assets -0.010059 -0.019133 0.000649***
(0.011046) (0.021056) (0.000174)
Loans over assets ratio -0.000137 -0.000379 0.000010**
(0.000149) (0.000352) (0.000005)
Bad loans over loans ratio -0.000116 0.000160 -0.000001
(0.000091) (0.000159) (0.000001)
Capital ratio 0.000037 -0.000020 0.000005
(0.000151) (0.000259) (0.000005)
Constant 6.620874*** 6.359898*** 7.348251***
(0.093916) (0.178951) (0.001628)
Bank F.E. YES YES YES
Bank-time controls YES YES YES
Observations 8 641 6 103 2 538
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.13
Number of banks 749 540 209
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of the stock of credit
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Table 6: Transmission of TLTRO liquidity to the stock of credit, for large and small banks, 
for the Euro area 
The table shows the estimated parameters and the standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (1), 
from April 2014 to January 2018.  The sample of banks in the two groups of countries was divided into 
large and small banks, assessed by its total assets: banks were considered as large banks if its amount of 
total assets was, on average, higher than or equal to EUR 1 000 million and as small banks, otherwise. 






All banks All banks Large banks Small banks All banks Large banks Small banks
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of TLTRO x
2014 -0.000133 -0.000530 -0.000712 0.001413* 0.000004 0.000002 -0.000002
(0.000276) (0.000758) (0.000675) (0.000794) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000004)
2015 0.000097 -0.000454 -0.000661 0.001622* 0.000006 0.000002 0.000008
(0.000251) (0.000929) (0.000931) (0.000902) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000005)
2016 0.001095 0.001659 0.001789 0.001043* 0.000014*** 0.000010** 0.000017***
(0.000837) (0.001280) (0.001570) (0.000580) (0.000005) (0.000005) (0.000005)
2017 0.001013 0.001571 0.001726 0.000691 0.000021*** 0.000018*** 0.000022***
(0.000791) (0.001252) (0.001513) (0.000420) (0.000007) (0.000007) (0.000005)
Log of total assets -0.010059 -0.019133 -0.026252 0.005995 0.000649*** 0.000665*** 0.000657***
(0.011046) (0.021056) (0.027268) (0.007818) (0.000174) (0.000228) (0.000151)
Loans over assets ratio -0.000137 -0.000379 -0.000647 0.000033 0.000010** 0.000011** 0.000010***
(0.000149) (0.000352) (0.000561) (0.000242) (0.000005) (0.000006) (0.000003)
Bad loans over loans ratio -0.000116 0.000160 0.000168 0.000107 -0.000001 -0.000000 -0.000000
(0.000091) (0.000159) (0.000324) (0.000128) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001)
Capital ratio 0.000037 -0.000020 -0.000091 0.000215 0.000005 0.000004 0.000003
(0.000151) (0.000259) (0.000301) (0.000200) (0.000005) (0.000005) (0.000005)
Constant 6.620874*** 6.359898*** 7.453454*** 4.844463*** 7.348251*** 8.067648*** 5.445451***
(0.093916) (0.178951) (0.266928) (0.040894) (0.001628) (0.002287) (0.001046)
Bank F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 8 641 6 103 3 467 2 636 2 538 1 843 695
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.41
Number of banks 749 540 290 250 209 143 66
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of the stock of credit
Less vulnerable countries Vulnerable countries
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Table 7: TLTRO and competition in the banking sector for the Euro area 
The table shows the estimated parameters and the standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (2), 





All countries Less vulnerable countries Vulnerable countries
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Log of TLTRO x
2014 -0.000280 -0.000862 0.000010
(0.000536) (0.001187) (0.000007)
2015 -0.000185 -0.000832 0.000006
(0.000691) (0.001452) (0.000005)
2016 0.001661 0.002151 0.000019**
(0.001280) (0.001671) (0.000007)
2017 0.001586 0.002053 0.000029***
(0.001273) (0.001669) (0.000011)
Log of TLTRO x HI x
2014 0.000908 0.004284 -0.000083
(0.003020) (0.006419) (0.000061)
2015 0.002554 0.005482 -0.000012
(0.005646) (0.008445) (0.000039)
2016 -0.010631 -0.010524 -0.000074
(0.008503) (0.008622) (0.000051)
2017 -0.010746 -0.010703 -0.000106
(0.009126) (0.009440) (0.000076)
Log of total assets -0.011738 -0.020187 0.000644***
(0.012665) (0.022082) (0.000166)
Loans over assets ratio -0.000163 -0.000398 0.000010**
(0.000160) (0.000365) (0.000005)
Bad loans over loans ratio -0.000091 0.000175 -0.000001
(0.000073) (0.000171) (0.000001)
Capital ratio 0.000001 -0.000074 0.000005
(0.000181) (0.000301) (0.000005)
Constant 6.635999*** 6.369800*** 7.347056***
(0.107937) (0.188330) (0.001552)
Bank F.E. YES YES YES
Bank-time controls YES YES YES
Observations 8 641 6 103 2 538
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.14
Number of banks 749 540 209
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of the stock of credit
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Table 8: Transmission of TLTRO liquidity to the stock of credit for Portugal 
The table shows the estimated parameters and the standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (3), 
from February 2011 to January 2018.  The sample of banks in the two groups of countries was divided 
into large and small banks, assessed by its total assets: banks were considered as large banks if its amount 
of total assets was, on average, higher than or equal to EUR 1 000 million and as small banks, otherwise. 
In the binary treatment, the TLTRO variable is a dummy variable equal to one after the announcement 
of the policy if the bank has participated in the TLTRO. The continuous treatment measures the intensity 
of the treatment, as the TLTRO variable is the natural logarithm of the TLTRO outstanding amount. 
Robust standard errors: clustered at the bank level in parenthesis. 
 
  
All Large banks Small banks All Large banks Small banks
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLTRO x
2014 0.0615 0.0004 0.1642 -0.0135 0.0043 0.0814
(0.0971) (0.1004) (0.1274) (0.0140) (0.0111) (0.1349)
2015 0.1297 0.0774 0.2552 -0.0099 0.0041 0.0607
(0.0829) (0.0714) (0.1892) (0.0141) (0.0086) (0.1078)
2016 0.1037 0.0482 0.3208 -0.0057 0.0108 0.0323
(0.1287) (0.0860) (0.3109) (0.0135) (0.0083) (0.0984)
2017 0.1116 0.0871 0.2841 -0.0078 0.0125 -0.0349
(0.1258) (0.0875) (0.3371) (0.0127) (0.0092) (0.0597)
Interest rate 0.0920 0.0916 0.2069 -0.0118 0.0227 -0.0149*
(0.1133) (0.1008) (0.3225) (0.0091) (0.0163) (0.0077)
Log of total assets -0.0092 0.0228 -0.0111 0.8629*** 0.4751*** 0.7060***
(0.0090) (0.0157) (0.0065) (0.1399) (0.1421) (0.2357)
Loans over assets ratio 0.8503*** 0.4746*** 0.6530** 0.0095** 0.0147*** 0.0033
(0.1369) (0.1371) (0.2302) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0060)
Bad loans over loans ratio 0.0096** 0.0148*** 0.0034 -0.0027 -0.0032 0.0019
(0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0059) (0.0033) (0.0096) (0.0052)
Government bonds over assets ratio -0.0043 -0.0048 0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0019
(0.0033) (0.0105) (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0035)
Post -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0013 0.1369 0.0100 0.2375
(0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0932) (0.0969) (0.1430)
Constant -0.8193 2.3018* 0.3766 -0.8944 2.3010* 0.1081
(1.2498) (1.2653) (1.3656) (1.2908) (1.3072) (1.4421)
Bank F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2 762 1 597 1 165 2 762 1 597 1 165
R-squared 0.38 0.16 0.39 0.37 0.16 0.39
Number of banks 35 20 15 35 20 15
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of the stock of credit
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
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Table 9: Transmission of TLTRO liquidity to the cost of credit for Portugal 
The table shows the estimated parameters and the standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (4), 
from February 2011 to January 2018.  The sample of banks in the two groups of countries was divided 
into large and small banks, assessed by its total assets: banks were considered as large banks if its amount 
of total assets was, on average, higher than or equal to EUR 1 000 million and as small banks, otherwise. 
In the binary treatment, the TLTRO variable is a dummy variable equal to one after the announcement 
of the policy if the bank has participated in the TLTRO. The continuous treatment measures the intensity 
of the treatment, as the TLTRO variable is the natural logarithm of the TLTRO outstanding amount. 
Robust standard errors: clustered at the bank level in parenthesis. 
 
 
All Large banks Small banks All Large banks Small banks
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLTRO x
2014 -0.1350 -0.6136** -0.4080 0.0290 -0.0285 0.4637
(0.1892) (0.2807) (0.5176) (0.0397) (0.0656) (0.4643)
2015 -0.3222 -0.9549* -0.6736 -0.0566* -0.1061 -0.0591
(0.3107) (0.5105) (0.9266) (0.0335) (0.0650) (0.3111)
2016 -1.1420*** -1.3370** -2.1078** -0.1366*** -0.1638** -0.3131
(0.2729) (0.5037) (0.7719) (0.0326) (0.0620) (0.1902)
2017 -1.6707*** -1.6292*** -2.9541*** -0.2121*** -0.2103*** -0.6608**
(0.3429) (0.5371) (0.9541) (0.0389) (0.0664) (0.2853)
Log of total assets 0.2201 0.2985 0.8540** 0.0959 0.2520 0.6791
(0.2146) (0.7370) (0.3978) (0.2231) (0.7443) (0.4559)
Loans over assets ratio 0.0090 0.0372* 0.0165 0.0084 0.0378* 0.0132
(0.0076) (0.0204) (0.0096) (0.0073) (0.0209) (0.0091)
Bad loans over loans ratio 0.0417** 0.1310 0.0058 0.0464** 0.1184 0.0077
(0.0168) (0.0953) (0.0141) (0.0208) (0.0929) (0.0154)
Government bonds over assets ratio -0.0135* -0.0039 -0.0079 -0.0123 -0.0030 -0.0050
(0.0070) (0.0097) (0.0124) (0.0078) (0.0099) (0.0142)
Post -1.5412*** -1.2012** -1.5714*** -1.7032*** -1.3793*** -1.9542***
(0.2149) (0.4838) (0.4275) (0.2284) (0.4400) (0.4505)
Constant 3.6933** -0.8884 -0.5944 4.6818** -0.5080 0.5990
(1.7314) (7.8469) (2.1339) (1.8636) (7.8629) (2.5235)
Bank F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2 762 1 597 1 165 2 762 1 597 1 165
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.22 0.36 0.39 0.21
Number of banks 35 20 15 35 20 15
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interest Rate
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
